A General Framework for the Assessment of Power System Vulnerability to Malicious Attacks by Piccinelli, R. et al.
HAL Id: hal-01786942
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01786942
Submitted on 23 Mar 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
A general framework for the assessment of power system
vulnerability to malicious attacks
R. Piccinelli, G. Sansavini, R. Lucchetti, Enrico Zio
To cite this version:
R. Piccinelli, G. Sansavini, R. Lucchetti, Enrico Zio. A general framework for the assessment of
power system vulnerability to malicious attacks. Risk Analysis, Wiley, 2017, 37 (11), pp.2182 - 2190.
￿10.1111/risa.12781￿. ￿hal-01786942￿
1 
 
A general framework for the assessment of power 
system vulnerability to malicious attacks 
 
R. Piccinelli,4 G. Sansavini,1 R. Lucchetti,2 and E. Zio3,4,∗ 
1 Reliability and Risk Engineering Laboratory, Institute of Energy Technology, Department of Mechanical 
and Process Engineering, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland. 
2 Dipartimento di Matematica - Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy. 
3 Chair System Science and The Energy Challenge, Fondation Electricite’ de France (EDF), 
CentraleSupelec, Universit ´e Paris-Saclay, Chatenay-Malabry, France. 
4 Dipartimento di Energia – Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy. 
∗ Address correspondence to Enrico Zio; enrico.zio@polimi.it 
 
Abstract. The protection and safe operations of power systems heavily rely on the identification of 
the causes of damage and service disruption. This paper presents a general framework for the assessment of 
power system vulnerability to malicious attacks. The concept of susceptibility to an attack is employed to 
quantitatively evaluate the degree of exposure of the system and its components to intentional offensive 
actions. A scenario with two agents having opposing objectives is proposed, i.e. a defender having multiple 
alternatives of protection strategies for system elements, and an attacker having multiple alternatives of 
attack strategies against different combinations of system elements. The defender aims to minimize the 
system susceptibility to the attack, subjected to budget constraints; on the other hand, the attacker aims to 
maximize the susceptibility. The problem is defined as a zero-sum game between the defender and the 
attacker. The assumption that the interests of the attacker and the defender are opposite, makes it irrelevant 
whether or not the defender shows the strategy he/she will use. Thus, the approaches “Leader-Follower 
game” or “simultaneous game” do not provide differences as far as the results are concerned. The results 
show an example of such a situation, and the von Neumann theorem is applied to find the (mixed) 
equilibrium strategies of the attacker and of the defender. 
Keywords: Susceptibility, zero-sum game, power systems, vulnerability, intentional attacks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Energy supply systems, such as power grids, are critical assets as any incapacity or destruction can 
have a debilitating impact on the Society’s efficiency, safety, security and economics [1]. Determining their 
degree of exposure to hazards and intentional attacks has become a topic of great concern. An analysis aimed 
at identifying the causes of damage or disruption of services in power systems is necessary for safe 
operations and protection. This requires an evaluation of the susceptibility to different hazards, including 
threats of malevolent acts. 
A key part of this analysis is the explicit modeling of the adversary behavior during an attack. To this 
aim, game theoretic methods are particularly attractive and have been widely used in risk analysis [2-6]. By 
focusing on the strategic interaction between the adversaries, these methods lead to behavioral predictions 
that explicitly account for the adaptive, intelligent nature of the adversary. A sense of the span, dimension 
and depth of the literature on the defense and attack of a system can be found in the review paper [7] and 
references therein. This review classifies and categorizes recent published papers according to the system 
structures, defense measures, and attack tactics and circumstances. Bier [8] describes a strategic model in 
which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a 
location to attack. The attacker – defender interaction focus on security investments and costs but choose 
different payoffs for a given target. Major [9] assumes that defenders and attackers have exactly the same 
valuations for potential targets: the value to the attacker is given only on the damage inflicted on the 
defender. But in principle, the value of the attacker of successfully attacking a given target may depend on 
factors different from the physical damage, such as the social impact of the damage inflicted.  
In this paper, a framework is proposed to assess the degree of exposure of a system to intentional 
attacks. The concept of susceptibility to an attack is employed to quantitatively assess the degree of exposure 
of the system and its components to intentional offensive actions. The susceptibility of a component is 
evaluated as a function of the characteristics of the system, i.e. size, level of protection and social criticality, 
and of the factors underpinning an intentional attack, i.e. attractivity and accessibility. The total susceptibility 
of a specific system configuration is quantified as the sum of the susceptibilities of its components.  
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The defender-attacker dynamics is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game, in which the attacker 
aims to incapacitate the component with the highest degree of exposure to threats, i.e. to maximize system 
susceptibility, and the defender aims to minimize the degree of exposure to attacks of the different 
components, i.e. to minimize system susceptibility. Attacker and defender are supposed to select their 
strategies independently, without observing the strategy chosen by the other player before choosing his own 
strategy. In infrastructure security, this hypothesis has been referred as non realistic since, for example, the 
defender may engage in costly defensive improvements over time and some of those defensive investments 
may be observable by the attacker [10].  However, some terrorist acts suggest that the attackers may indeed 
be choosing their targets regardless of the observed defense level [11] or attackers may choose to act without 
acquiring costly information about the security strategy, especially if security measures (e.g. surveillance, 
alarms) are difficult to obtain [12]. In such instances, the competition between the attacker and the defender 
may be realistically represented by a simultaneous-move zero-sum game. On the other hand, this type of 
games may fail in capturing the conflicting and partly conflicting interests between operator and generators 
in power markets [13]. To this aim, Leader-Follower games are deployed in which the generator, i.e. the 
follower, chooses his strategy after observing the strategies announced by the operator, i.e. the leader [13]. 
By assuming that the interests of the attacker and the defender are opposite, it is irrelevant whether or not the 
defender shows the strategy he will use. In this perspective, the objective of the study is (I) to find the less 
vulnerable configuration of the system that can be deployed, given a budget constraint, and (II) to identify 
the best strategies for the attacker and the defender. 
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the concept of susceptibility and its quantitative 
assessment are introduced. In Section 3, the scheme of the game is proposed, and in Section 4 the game is 
applied to a conceptual example of a power system in which the components are aggregated according to 
their operational role. Conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2. QUANTIFICATION OF SUSCEPTIBILITY 
The concept of vulnerability follows the degree of impact that a hazard has on Critical Infrastructures 
(CIs). In [14], vulnerability is defined as the “manifestation of inherent states of the system (e.g., physical, 
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technical, organizational, cultural) that can be exploited by an adversary to harm or damage the system”. 
Along the same line of thought, in [15] and [16] vulnerability is defined as “the degree to which a system, a 
subsystem or a system component is likely to experience harm due to exposure to a hazard, either a 
perturbation or stress”. In this paper, we adopt a similar perspective, considering vulnerability as the inability 
of a system to withstands strains and attacks. These definitions focus on the degree of loss and damages due 
to the impact of a hazard, i.e. on the technical dimensions of vulnerability: a weaker target is as likely to be 
attacked as a more secure target. But this assumption may not hold. The degree of loss and damages is 
determined by the degree of exposure to hazards and threats: all elements at risk do not show the same level 
of exposure to a hazard and when considering malevolent attacks, human actors are influenced by the 
vulnerability of a target. 
The concept of susceptibility has been introduced in [16] to measure the degree to which a critical 
infrastructure is prone and accessible both to hazards and threats. Susceptibility refers to the property of the 
system of being potentially damaged and combines the likelihood of a hazardous event, the differential 
exposure, the potential sensitivity of a system or element of the system exposed, i.e. the degree to which a 
system or the element could be potentially damaged or affected by a given hazard, and the existing capacity 
of this system that could potentially reduce this level of damage (e.g. existing measures of prevention, 
mitigation, etc.) [17]. 
In this context, the idea of susceptibility is meant to encompass that of probability for random events, 
while grasping the intentionality that is behind malevolent attacks. To relate the centrality of the state 
variables that describe the exposure of the system to threats, two key-points are the intent and the capability 
to attack a target and cause adverse effects [18]. Intent and capability define a threat to the system. 
Indeed, susceptibility must be a function of those factors that are involved in planning and 
performing an attack, i.e., the attractivity and the accessibility of a target. Attractivity considers the appeal of 
the target to intentional attacks and relates to the intent of causing damages. Accessibility considers that 
components have been designed for efficiency and convenience, yet access must be easy for maintenance 
staff but difficult for attacks [16], and relates to the capability of attack. Thus, the concept of susceptibility 
includes both a measure of how accessible and how attractive to terrorists a particular target is. 
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Therefore, the identification of the features of the system influencing its susceptibility to attacks, 
attractivity and accessibility, plays a key role in the vulnerability assessment of technical systems. 
Three influencing variables were identified as components of attractivity and accessibility (Figure 1) 
[19]:  
 Size (physical) of the component; 
 Level of protection: the logical and physical barriers deployed to prevent or discourage malevolent acts; 
 Social criticality: given that the attack will be successfully accomplished, the impact on public opinion is 
influenced by the (conditional) effects caused by the achieved intentional act. The most relevant 
consequences here considered are in terms of human lives and geographic extension of the event. 
 
SUSCEPTIBILITY
SIZE
LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION
SOCIAL 
CRITICALITY
ATTRACTIVITY ACCESSIBILITY
 
Figure 1. Pictorial representation of the susceptibility as a function of the characteristics of the system (size, level of 
protection and social criticality) and of the factors underpinning an intentional attack (attractivity and accessibility). 
 
In order to compute the susceptibility function, i.e., the payoff function, we need to quantify its 
influencing variables, namely size, level of protection and social criticality. The system under study is a 
power transmission system in which each component is considered according to its functional role. Three 
main roles can be identified: generating units, which supply power, load buses, which receive the power 
supplied by generators and transmission lines which spread the power from the source to the target. For the 
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moment, we neglect the influence of the component physical size on attractivity and on accessibility, and we 
propose a quantitative expression for susceptibility. 
We quantify the social criticality (SC) of a component i as proportional to the extent of the damage 
to the unprotected component, i.e. with a zero level of protection, LOPi =1: 
 
iiii qDAMAGEmSC                                               (1) 
 
Depending on the role of the component, DAMAGEi represents the power not supplied, transmitted 
or received and is expressed in terms of MW, so to be consistent with the size of medium transmission power 
systems. The coefficient mi in Eq. 1 also depends on the functionality of the component i and it weights the 
“importance” of the loss: for example, it is expected that the damage to a single transmission line can cause 
no loss if the power flow can be redistributed on other transmission lines (N-1 criterion), so the transmission 
line coefficient mi will be lower than mi for a bus (user) that does not receive power due to its incapacitation. 
Finally, qi expresses the perception of the disutility of the component i which subsumes the geographic 
extension and the number of potential victims. As a result, we have: 
 
oviderUserrTransmitte SCSCSC Pr                                         (2) 
 
This inequality considers that an attack launched to a generating unit can have a larger impact on the 
public opinion than an attack to transmission lines or to users. 
Six levels of protection (LOP) were introduced and identified in [16] by means of linguistic terms. 
The safeguards adopted for a component are gathered in 6 levels, from level 1, which identifies components 
with no protection such as transmission towers, to level 6 which denotes components such as power plants 
that need to be made inaccessible to possible attackers. These levels are, then, transposed in protection 
percentage values as shown in Table I:  
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Level of Protection (LOP) Description (Examples) Associated Percentage (%) 
6 – Extreme Completely secure, inaccessible 100 
5 – High Guarded, secure area, locked, alarmed, complex closure 86 
4 – Moderate Secure area, locked, complex closure 69 
3 – Low Complex barrier, security patrols, video surveillance 35 
2 – Very low Unlocked, noncomplex barriers (door or access panel) 17 
1 – Zero Completely open, no controls, no barriers 0 
Table I. Level of protection and associated percentage values. A range from 1 to 100 has been divided in six parts in order 
to associate a percentage to the linguistic description of the safeguards of the system. 
 
Given the values of social criticality (Eq. 1) and of the level of protection (Table I), we quantified the 
susceptibility of the component i as: 
 
i
LOP
SC
b
ii constanteSCaS
i
i 









                            (3) 
 
In Eq.3 it is assumed that a component whose attack has a great social impact on public opinion is 
more exposed to an attack, that is, has a greater susceptibility. On the other hand, if the component has high 
level of protection, the exposure to possible attacks should diminish.  
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Figure 2. Susceptibility of the “User” component evaluated from Eq. (3) as a function of the damage and level of 
protection. For the “User” component mi = 1.3, qi = 10 a = 1, b = 100 and constanti = 0.  
Figure 2 shows how our assumptions in the definition of susceptibility translate into the 
susceptibility function for the component “User”. Similar plots are obtained also for the other two types of 
components. Components which are poorly protected and whose incapacitation results in large damage are 
ranked high with respect to susceptibility. On the other hand, components which are well protected and 
whose incapacitation results in small damage are ranked low with respect to susceptibility.    
The sensitivity of the susceptibility indicator developed in Eq. (3) with respect to the damage extent 
and the level of protection is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Sensitivity of susceptibility of the “User” component with respect to the damage for two values of level of 
protection, i.e. LOP = 50% (dashed curve) and LOP = 0% (solid curve). For the “User” component mi = 1.3, qi = 10 a = 
1, b = 100 and constanti = 0. 
The sensitivity of the variable Y with respect to the variable Xi is evaluated through a local method as 
the partial derivative  
0
i X
Y
X


 where the remaining variables 0X   have constant value. Figure 3 shows the 
sensitivity of the susceptibility, 
LOP
S
Damage


, of the “User” component with respect to the damage for 
two values of level of protection, i.e. LOP = 50% (dashed curve) and LOP = 0% (solid curve). The 
developed susceptibility function is more sensitive for critical scenarios, i.e. when the level of protection is 
small. For constant level of protection, the susceptibility is more sensitive with increasing damage extent, 
which is a reasonable result of our assumptions.    
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Figure 4. Sensitivity of susceptibility of the “User” component with respect to the level of protection for two values of 
damage, i.e. Damage = 20 MW (dashed curve) and Damage = 100 MW (solid curve). For the “User” component mi = 
1.3, qi = 10 a = 1, b = 100 and constanti = 0. 
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the susceptibility, 
Damage
S
LOP


, of the “User” component with 
respect to the damage for two values of level of protection, i.e. Damage = 20 MW (dashed curve) and 
Damage = 100 MW (solid curve). The developed susceptibility function is more sensitive for critical 
scenarios, i.e. when the damage extent is large. For constant damage extent, the susceptibility is more 
sensitive with decreasing level of protection, which is a reasonable result of our assumptions. 
For the entire system, the total susceptibility is the sum of the susceptibilities of the components: 

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
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
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

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
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SC
b
i constanteSCaS
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i                                    (4) 
 
3. THE TWO-PLAYER ZERO-SUM GAME 
Our model of the game considers two players: an attacker and a defender. We assume that the 
attacker aims at the destruction of the system or of a part of it: his aim is to maximize the losses he can cause 
to the system. From this point of view, an attacker will aim at incapacitating the component with the highest 
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degree of exposure to threats which could guarantee a successful attack. On the other side, the defender 
wants to minimize the damage produced on the system by malevolent acts, and he will try to protect the 
system by changing the levels of protection of the different components. His/her aim is to minimize the 
degree of exposure to attacks of the different components.  
The objective of the game is to find the less vulnerable configuration of the system that can be 
deployed, given a constraint on the applicable level of protections. We assume the susceptibility function to 
represents the utility (payoff) function for the game: one player, i.e. the attacker, wants to maximize it; the 
other player, i.e. the defender, needs to minimize it. Both players compete on the same quantity and try to 
maximize or minimize it, therefore the game outlines as a zero-sum game: a gain for the attacker entails a 
corresponding loss for the defender and vice versa. 
As for the strategies, we assume that the attacker takes the offensive and strikes a component. The 
strategy of the defender will be to arrange all the possible protections to limit the damage caused by possible 
attacks. To this aim, each component of the system is assigned a value of susceptibility, which will depend 
on its social criticality (SCi) and on its current level of protection (LOPi). The susceptibility values are 
computed using Eq. 4 and they represent the original system configuration. 
The defender can act by changing the LOP of different components. The changes executed on the 
system identify a protection strategy. The susceptibility of the system will change with reference to the initial 
configuration accordingly to the protection strategy X carried out: 
 
 
 
 
_
, ,X i i i i i i
i iSTRATEGY X INITIAL CONFIGURATION
S S SC LOP S SC LOP
   
     
   
           (5) 
 
where the sum extends over all components i. 
The payoff definition in Eq. (5) is consistent with the aim of the present study to quantify the 
variations of susceptibility which result from different protection strategies. As a matter of fact, different 
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components have different levels of protection (LOPi) and alternative attack strategies have different values 
for the attacker. On the other hand, our focus is on the variations of susceptibility with respect to the current 
system configuration. Therefore, the payoffs for the different strategies are normalized to be able to capture 
the changes with respect to the initial configuration. 
Our model assumes that the players know both the own and the opponent’s strategy spaces and the 
associated utility functions, i.e. the defender knows the possible attack strategies and the attacker knows the 
defensive options. On the other hand, the model assumes that one player does not observe the actions of the 
other player, e.g. the attacker will not see/know the level of protection chosen by the defender when deciding 
his attack, and is configured as a simultaneous game. The situation in which the defender shows the current 
level of protection and the attacker can observe it, would be modeled as a Leader-Follower game. However, 
it is immediate to observe that for a zero-sum game both the simultaneous game and the Leader-Follower 
game lead to the same results. Therefore, the adopted model is robust with respect to the assumption of 
observability. For the basics on game theory, see [20], [21], for application to security games see [12], [22]. 
 
4. RESULTS 
We exemplify the power grid with its functional model. In the conceptual representation of the 
system (Figure 5), only the operational role of the components is considered: generating units (G), load buses 
(B) and transmission lines (T). 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the functional components of a transmission network. The fundamental 
components here considered are: a generator unit (G), a bus or load (B) and transmission lines (T). 
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Starting from the initial configuration (Config. 0 in Table II), the level of protection (LOP) of the 
different components may be increased (+) or decreased (-) by a certain amount or can be left unchanged (0). 
In this example, we assume that, for each component, only a unitary increase or decrease of LOP is allowed, 
i.e. ΔLOP = ± 1 compared to the initial configuration. Moreover, we assume that the cost of increasing LOP 
by one is the opposite of the cost of decreasing LOP by the same amount, and that for each configuration the 
aggregated cost of changing LOP is constrained to be zero. This reflects the limitations of constrained 
budget. The possible configuration variations for the conceptual example are represented in Table II: 
 
Component Config.0 Config.1 Config.2 Config.3 Config.4 Config.5 Config.6 
G 0 + + 0 0 - - 
T 0 - 0 + - + 0 
B 0 0 - - + 0 + 
Table II. Table of the possible configuration variations for the conceptual system. The first column represents the 
variation with respect to the reference configuration (0 means no variation). In each consecutive column, an increase in 
the level of protection is specified with a (+) if there is an increase in the level of protection, whereas (-) represents a 
decrease and 0 represents no variation. 
 
 
In order to maintain a zero cost constraint, for an increase in the level of protection on one 
component we need to have a decrease of the same amount on another element of the system. For example 
(Table III), in the configuration number 2, the defender chooses to elevate the level of protection for the 
generating units from level 3 to level 4 and, in order to maintain the constraint on costs, he diminishes the 
protection on bus from level 3 to level 2. The components with 0, the transmission line in strategy 2, undergo 
no changes. 
 
 
Component Config.0 Config.1 Config.2 Config.3 Config.4 Config.5 Config.6 
G 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 
T 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 
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B 3 3 2 2 4 3 4 
 
Table III. Table of the levels of protection in each configuration for the conceptual system. The levels of protection are 
specified according to the levels shown in Table I. 
 
Given the possible choices of levels of protection, for each component of the system, the incremental 
susceptibilities (Eq. 5) are computed and collected in Table IV. Each element of Table IV represents the 
incremental susceptibility due to the variation of the degree of exposure to an attack, i.e., the susceptibility 
function due to a change in the level of protection with respect to the susceptibility computed for the initial 
configuration. If the level of protection of component i is increased with respect to Config. 0, the 
susceptibility of component i to attack decreases and the incremental value is negative. On the other hand, if 
the level of protection of component i is decreased with respect to Config. 0, its exposure to attacks 
increases, the susceptibility to attack raises and the incremental value is positive. Finally, if the level of 
protection of component i is unchanged, there is no variation in the susceptibility with respect to the initial 
configuration. 
The simulation of the game was performed on the system, and the output susceptibility values are 
summarized in Table IV. 
 
 
DEFENDER 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.0000 0.0000 0.4028 0.0000 0.0000 0.1668 0.4304 
A
T
T
A
C
K
E
R
 
G 0.2138 0 -31 -31 0 0 17 17 
T 0.4410 0 11 0 -13 11 -13 0 
B 0.3452 0 0 12 12 -17 0 -17 
Table IV. Table of the possible strategies for the conceptual system. 
 
 
The value of the game is -2.2388. This means that in the described situation the defender is able to 
increase his/her advantage with respect to the attacker. In order to do this, we observe that his best strategy 
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assigns null probability to some strategies (columns 0, 1, 3, 4). In particular, he will always change his 
current status in presence of an attack. On the other hand, it may happen that this is not true in other cases. 
For instance, the best strategy assigns a probability p6 = 0.4304, to strategy 6, probability p2= 0.4028, to 
strategy 2 and probability p5 = 0.1668 to strategy 5. The result is not surprising, pure equilibrium strategies 
are unusual in the context of zero-sum games, as the example of the world-famous rock-paper-scissors game 
shows. 
Compared to the initial configuration of the system, in strategy 6 the defender has increased the level 
of protection for the bus unit (corresponding to a decrease in the susceptibility) and has decreased the level 
of protection of the generating unit. In strategy 2, the defender can do exactly the opposite: he can increase 
the level of protection of the generating unit and decrease the level of protection of the load bus. Finally, in 
strategy 5 there is an increase in the level of protection of the transmission lines to the detriment of the 
protection for the generating unit. 
On the other hand, the attacker can use all strategies when acting optimally, because all his pure 
strategies are a best reaction to the defender’s strategy. Nonetheless, his target will more likely be component 
T. So in case of multiple attacks, we should see T attached more frequently. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Determining the power grid degree of exposure to hazards and intentional attacks has become a topic 
of great concern. An analysis aimed at identifying the causes of damage or disruption of services in power 
systems is necessary for safe operation and protection. In this paper, a general framework for the assessment 
of power systems vulnerability to malicious attacks has been presented. A two-player zero-sum game is 
envisaged between an attacker and a defender. The Nash equilibrium provides a useful overall measure of 
the network susceptibility to an attack, based on the inherent characteristic of the system. The results identify 
the best strategies for both the attacker and the defender under the following adopted assumptions: 
 The social criticality of a component is linearly dependent on the damage extent; 
 The susceptibility of a component can be described in terms of attractivity and accessibility; 
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 The attacker-defender dynamics can be modeled as a zero-sum game; 
 The possible system modifications are subjected to cost constraints. 
In the described situation, when acting optimally, the defender is able to increase his/her advantage 
with respect to the attacker. In particular, he will change his current status in presence of an attack. When 
the option is to reconfigure the system protection with the constraint of zero additional costs, the defender’s 
optimal strategies will be (1) to increase the protection of buses at the expenses of protection of generators 
and, vice versa, (2) to increase the protection of generators at the expenses of protection of buses. On the 
other hand, the attacker can use all strategies when acting optimally, because all his pure strategies are a 
best reaction to the defender’s strategy. Based on the specific case study in which the defender can 
reconfigure the system protection with the constraint of zero additional costs and the attacker can strike 
only one component, the attacker shows a preferential target, i.e. the transmission system.  
Zero-sum games are a special class of the strictly competitive games. However, every strictly 
competitive game can be transformed in a zero-sum game with admissible transformation of utilities of the 
players. Thus, they can well describe contests in which the players have opposite goals. Therefore, all 
outcomes are efficient, i.e. by switching from an outcome to another one, one player necessarily increases 
his payoff, and the other one necessarily decreases his. This behavior realistically represents an attacker-
defender situation, like the one illustrated here. 
The method has been applied to a conceptual case study in which components have been 
aggregated according to their operational role, and it can be extended to account for a large-scale spatial-
distributed infrastructure. 
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